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Abstract
A sizeable literature studies whether governments strategically interact with each other
through policy-di↵usion, learning, fiscal and yardstick competition. This paper asks
whether, in the presence of direct democratic institutions, spatial interactions addi-
tionally result from voters’ direct actions. The proposed mechanism is that the voters’
actions in vetoing a decision or inaugurating a preferred policy by a binding initiative
in their jurisdiction can potentially have spillover e↵ects on the actions of voters and
special interest groups of neighboring jurisdictions. Utilizing data on around 1,800
voter-petitions across over 12,000 German municipalities in 2002-09, we find that a
jurisdiction’s probability of hosting a petition is positively driven by the neighbors’ di-
rect democratic activity. These e↵ects are persistent, and are stronger for more visible
instruments of direct democracy. The interactions are also mostly driven by petitions
in same or similiar policy areas, and are stronger in towns with relatively more per
capita newspapers.
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1 Introduction
A sizeable literature in economics and political science studies the question of how strategic
interactions among political jurisdictions a↵ect their choice of public policies. Such inter-
actions may occur horizontally or vertically and between or within countries, in general,
because of competition, coercion and learning. The fields of public finance and public eco-
nomics have put forward several mechanisms that underlie such spatial relationships in the
governments’ spending and taxing decisions (Revelli, 2005) and in other public sector policies
(Brueckner, 2003).
According to the externality mechanism, a local government may find it optimal to in-
ternalize a policy set by another government, say in the field of education or health care,
when making its own decision to build more or less schools and hospitals (Case et al., 1993).
More generally, local state capacity building can be a strategic choice for municipalities when
borders across municipalities are porous (Acemoglu et al., 2015). A particular economic con-
straint, however, may be due to competition for attracting mobile resources such as labor
and capital through fiscal (including tax) competition (Tiebout, 1956; Wilson, 1999). In
a principal-agent framework with incomplete information, a decision-maker is additionally
subject to yardstick competition if the principals form certain expectations in regard to their
jurisdiction’s (not perfectly observable) performance, for example in the quality of public
service provision, by relying on other jurisdictions’ (again not perfectly observable, but com-
parable) performance as a yardstick (Besley and Case, 1995). Furthermore, representatives
may learn from (the success or failure of) neighbor’s policies and mimic these accordingly.
Based on theoretical models of policy choice, Volden et al. (2008) formalize such learning-
based policy-di↵usion mechanisms and Mukand and Rodrik (2005) conceptualize the related
idea of policy experimentation.
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The outcomes of these often competing mechanisms can be similar, however with quite
di↵erent implications for policy. Therefore, significant e↵ort has been put to disentangle these
mechanisms (Shipan and Volden, 2008), particularly with an empirical strategy of comparing
sub-national jurisdictions within countries (Brueckner, 2003). However, what this literature
has in common is that it almost exclusively focuses on economic systems based on a pure
representative form of government. The first contribution of this paper is to study political
systems where decisions can be made also directly by voters through initiatives or other direct
democratic instruments. The basic idea is that the voters’ actions in vetoing a decision or
inaugurating a preferred policy by a binding initiative in their jurisdiction may potentially
have spillover e↵ects on the (direct democratic) actions of voters and special interest groups
of other jurisdictions.
Theoretically, the proposed channel can be thought of (groups of) voters as collective
decision-makers interacting with each other similar to individuals in the social interactions
analysis (Manski, 2000). Of course, voters do have a role to play in a representative system,
where, for example, they can “vote with their feet” a↵ecting competition and the implied
interactions. Voters can also influence political decisions outside of elections, such as through
popular mobilization. In fact, a large literature in political science and sociology argues that
such instances of collective action do not take place in isolation, but are often the result
of significant spillovers across time and jurisdictions (Snow et al., 2004). Relatedly, our
argument is that direct democracy provides a new and legitimate decision-making institution
which may or may not be mimicked across-jurisdiction. This is the central hypothesis we
aim to test in this paper.
Regarding the relevance of the hypothesis, most of the previous empirical contributions on
spatial interaction in public policies concentrate on higher income countries with some level
of autonomy in sub-national governance. Many of these countries by now have some kind of
direct democratic institutions at the local level, therefore testing the proposed hypothesis of
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interactions through direct decision-making mechanisms seems timely. Moreover, a central
concern with the observed spatial patterns in jurisdictions’ policies, has been the empirical
di culties in isolating possible common shocks or spatially correlated (unobservable) e↵ects
from the real e↵ects of interest (Gibbons and Overman, 2012). Several recent papers that
rely on arguably more credible identification techniques by utilizing sources of exogenous
variation (see, e.g. Lyytika¨inen, 2012; Isen, 2014; Baskaran, 2014, 2015) find that some of
the previously documented strong e↵ects could be due to spurious correlations. The second
contribution of our paper is to add to this dilemma by not only considering a possibly new
mechanism for the e↵ects, but also by departing from the standard approach to spatial
econometrics and relying instead on quasi-exogenous variation in our treatment.
In particular, we focus on Germany, where since the mid-1990s citizens have the power to
veto (some of) local governments’ decisions and propose certain new policies by launching
binding initiatives. Our empirical strategy is to test for spatial interactions in the occurence
of these initiatives for a sample of around 12,000 German towns from 2002 to 2009. We ap-
ply spatial reaction functions and exploit a (quasi-random) exogenous instrument to identify
interactions between municipalities. Our findings suggest that the probability of observing
a petition or an initiative in a municipality is positively driven by its neighbors’ activity in
direct democracy. The response of an average municipality is strong with the probability of
hosting a petition rising by about 26% if one of its neighbors hosts one more petition. Such
e↵ects are persistent but decreasing over time and space, and are stronger for institutions
of direct democracy which are better observable. These spatial interactions are also mostly
driven by petitions in same or similiar policy areas, and are stronger in towns with rela-
tively more per capita newspapers. Our baseline results are robust to di↵erent definitions of
neighborhood and weighting schemes.
To put into context, this paper is related to the literature explaining (the extent of) spa-
tial interactions by certain political-economy factors in general, and from the representative
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versus direct democracy angle in particular. In the theoretical framework of Hugh-Jones
(2009) interactions may exist either for policy experimentation (citizens themselves observe
the e↵ects of policy) which is possible only in a direct democratic system, or for yardstick
competition in representative systems. The theoretical paper by Boehmke (1999) argues
that interactions can be more intensive between jurisdictions that have direct democratic
systems compared to representative democracies, but this is explained primarily by informa-
tional advantages of the former system. In contrast, the empirical study of Schaltegger and
Ku¨ttel (2002) with Swiss data argues that direct democracy (and fiscal autonomy) signifi-
cantly increases the level of political competition and, therefore, reduces the scope of policy
mimicking. The authors, however, do not analyze the channel that we propose here – that
is the potential scope for spillovers through direct democratic institutions. Also, the focus is
on referendums, thus, only on the veto-power of direct democracy, while the agenda-setting
function of initiatives, which may actually enhance the policy space and not the opposite,
is neglected. Finally, Hawley and Rork (2015) study spatial determinants of the property
tax limit overrides in Massachusetts and demonstrate that a town’s likelihood of holding
an initial vote increases by 10-15% if a neighboring town has already held a vote at some
point in the past. This evidence combined with our findings reinforce the result of strong
spatial interactions in direct democratic instruments in two di↵erent settings. In contrast
to our paper, however, the focus of Hawley and Rork (2015) is again on referendums called
by the government, which only allows studying government-level interactions. Furthermore,
the referendums analyzed by Hawley and Rork (2015) are about a specific topic (i.e. the
property tax limits) whereas our study covers a broader range of policy issues.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the German institutions of
direct democracy and presents some anecdotal evidence on spillover mechanisms. Section 3
describes our data and identification strategy, and Section 4 presents the results. Conclusions
are discussed in Section 5.
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2 Institutions and spillover mechanisms
Most German La¨nder (henceforth: states) introduced local-level direct democratic institu-
tions in the 1990s after the German re-unification. Baden-Wu¨rttemberg is an exception with
institutions of direct democracy on the local level since 1956. Berlin is the last state which
introduced the possibility of petitions and initiatives in 2005.
These institutions enable the citizens to launch so-called citizen petitions (“Bu¨rgerbegehren”)
which are divided into innovative petitions (“Initiativbegehren”) and corrective petitions
(“Korrekturbegehren”). The latter is used to veto on policies which have been adopted by
the city council, while the former allows to launch new policies. For a petition to be suc-
cessfully implemented, the initiators face several constrains. First, town- and state-specific
amount of signatures has to be collected (minimum signature requirement) within a prede-
fined time. If this is achieved, the city council will decide if it wants to realize the issue
at hand or not. In case of negative decision, the next step of the procedure is reached, i.e.
the petition is implemented as an initiative (“Bu¨rgerentscheid”). Besides a simple majority,
some states further require a certain quorum (minimum turnout relative to population) for
the initiative to be accepted. Another limitation concerning local direct democracy in Ger-
many are topic exclusions. In all states topics which directly concern the municipal budgets
are not allowed for petitions (fiscal taboo). Moreover, each state has a list of other prohib-
ited topics (o↵-limits issues) or even a narrow list of allowed topics (positive catalogue). All
states except Bayern and Bremen also demand a cost-recovery proposal with the suggested
petition.
Looking into the data we observe a higher activity of direct democracy in states with less
strict institutions. For example, Bayern which has comparatively liberal institutions already
launched around 2,500 petitions until 2013. On the contrary, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg with
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very rigorous regulations only launched less than 80 petitions until 2013.1 The geographical
distribution of the number of petitions is illustrated in a heat-map in Figure A1 of the
appendix, and Table A1 summarizes some of the state-level institutions of direct democracy.
With these direct democratic institutions in place, the argument is that there is an addi-
tional mechanisms at the hands of voters which may be used to (ban) mimic (non-)preferred
policies across jurisdictions. In more general terms, citizens may more e↵ectively use their
“voice” (Hirschman, 1970) when observing high democratic engagement in neighboring ju-
risdictions.2 Anecdotal evidence from the following cases helps to better understand the
idea.
The construction of a new railway station in the city of Stuttgart is an example for direct
democratic activity being contagious across jurisdictions. The so-called Stuttgart 21 project
calls for deconstructing two wings of a century-old train station and replacing above-ground
tracks with a tunnel system which is supposed to speed up travel times. However, since
2007 there have been several petitions which all aimed at stopping the project.3 This direct
democratic engagement by the population supposedly had spillover e↵ects on the citizens of
other municipalities, for example, in the close-by town of Leonberg where citizens launched
a petition in 2011 against the demolition of the public indoor swimming pool and the related
plans of building a new swimming pool. One of the initiators of the petition explicitly stated
that their activities have been inspired by the Stuttgart 21 opposition.4 Besides the di↵usion
1 For more detailed information on the history of German institutions of direct democracy see e.g.
Asatryan (2014) and Rehmet et al. (2014).
2 In practice, this interaction can not only occur by mimicking of petitions and initiatives but also by
less formal means, for example by demonstrations or informal initiatives. However, in our paper we
focus on spillovers of o cial petitions and initiatives. In a sense, our results therefore constitute a lower
bound estimate for spillover e↵ects in direct democratic engagement of citizens.
3 In 2010, protests against this long-term project accumulated in large demonstrations. See for example
an article published in the New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/world/europe/06germany.html?_r=0
4 For example in the regional newspaper “Stuttgarter Nachrichten”, which serves subscribers in both
municipalities Stuttgart and Leonberg: http://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/inhalt.
buerger-begehren-die-sanierung-des-sportzentrums.
4c32408a-5936-44dd-93b8-5bef9a6a138b.html
7
in direct democratic activity, this case illustrates an additional notion of di↵usion, namely
the di↵usion of preferences. With the petitions at hand, citizens wanted to preserve an
already existing infrastructure instead of demolishing it and building a new one.
A similar observation can be made for two other close-by municipalities, Denklingen and
Seefeld in the state of Bayern. In Denklingen, there was a long-standing discussion whether
to build a new city hall or to renovate and extend the old one. This led to a petition
against building a new city hall which was accompanied by many newspaper articles about
the topic.5 Shortly afterwards, a very similar discussion arose in Seefeld which then also led
to a petition.
These observations are related to the mechanisms described by the literature on di↵usion
processes within and across movements.6 Proximal models stipulate that actors mimic other
people’s or groups’ strategies which are spatially or culturally important to them (e.g. Soule
(1995) and Soule (1997) in the context of student movements). In these settings, di↵usion
is promoted by direct and indirect channels. Direct channels refer to the existence of fre-
quent contacts between the actors or even their overlapping engagement in more than one
movement. These direct channels might also occur for the case of direct democracy when,
for example, special interest groups spread to close-by municipalities. However, it is also
well possible that di↵usion takes place by more indirect channels like media coverage (and
the consequent informational flows between voters) as described by Snow et al. (2004, p.
295) when the organizers are “unconnected”. In the context of race riots in the US, for
example, Myers (2000) finds that wider media coverage increases the penetration of riots in
5 For example, see the following reports from the two newspapers which cover both of the
municipalities: http://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/landsberg/
754-Unterschriften-fuer-Rathaus-Stopp-id28639427.html or http://www.kreisbote.de/
lokales/landsberg/buergerentscheid-ueber-rathaus-stopp-3354717.html.
6 Please see Snow et al. (2004) in general, and Soule’s contribution in particular for a summary on the
di↵usion research in the field of social movements.
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neighboring areas. We take such indirect channels into account and test if information flows
play a role in mimicking direct democratic activity.
As explained above initiatives in German towns may address di↵erent fields of public
policies. Therefore, our empirical setup allows to test not only whether spillovers may be
due to more direct democratic engagement, but also whether these spillovers are solely driven
by initiatives within similar policy areas. Parallels can again be drawn with the government-
level interaction channels. If governments search for better policies because of yardstick and
fiscal competition due to voters looking across borders or threatening to exit, the question
is why voters themselves cannot directly implement such policies when direct democratic
rights are available.
Following the theoretical arguments and the anecdotal evidence discussed in the intro-
duction and this section, we arrive to the main hypothesis of this work: Complementing a
representative system of local governance with some institutions of direct democracy may
open a new channel of policy-spillovers across jurisdictions that functions through inter-
actions between (groups of) voters and their actions in exploiting their direct democratic
rights. The next sections proceed to a formal analysis of this hypothesis.
In the case of yardstick competition, citizens evaluate their politicians’ performance by
comparing their jurisdiction’s outcomes with the one’s of their neighbors. 7
3 Data and specification
We test for spillovers direct democratic activity by specifying a reaction function (spatial lag
model) similar to the approach employed by the literature on public budget spillovers, e.g.
Foucault et al. (2008) for public expenditure decisions in French municipalities and Sole´-Olle´
7 Besley and Case (1995) provide theoretical and empirical evidence on this in the context of US states’s
tax-setting and Rincke (2009) empirically identifies yardstick competition in the context of public sector
technologies.
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(2001) for local governments in Spain.8 Our empirical specification is also in line with the tax
reaction functions used by the sizable literature on tax interactions between municipalities
(see, e.g. Allers and Elhorst, 2005; Leprince et al., 2007; Bordignon et al., 2003; Buettner,
2001; Hauptmeier et al., 2012) and between countries (see, e.g. Davies and Voget, 2008;
Devereux et al., 2008; Egger and Ra↵, 2014; Overesch and Rincke, 2011; Redoano, 2014).
We specify the following linear probability model in order to test if citizens mimic their
dire000ct democratic activities across jurisdictions:
d pit =  
NX
j 6=i
wjpjt +Xit  + ↵1s + µ1t + "1it (1)
where the dependent variable d pit is a dummy which is one if there was at least one
petition launched by citizens of municipality i in year t. On the right hand side, Xit is a
set of standard demographic and political controls on municipality level; ↵1s and µ1t are
state and year dummies, and "1it is an unobserved error term. The spatial lag (
PN
j=1wjpjt)
constitutes the variable of interest which is the (weighted) sum of the number of initiatives
in neighbor municipalities of i weighted by di↵erent schemes (see below). In the baseline
specification municipalities within a 50 km radius of municipality i qualify as neighbors in
our main specification. This reflects the idea that spillovers in direct democratic actions are
likely to be a rather regional phenomenon and that municipalities beyond 50 km may be
on average too far away for having an e↵ect on municipality i, for example due to limited
information flows across regions.9
8 Please also see Besley and Case (1995) for public spending interactions.
9 In 2014 regional newspapers make up almost 75% of the total sales of daily newspapers in Germany
(Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e.V., 2015, p. 5). These regional newspapers put a strong
emphasis on regional news. With respect to direct exchange between individuals, Mok and Wellman
(2007) also show that distance matters for interpersonal contact.
Similarly, the fiscal spillover literature also assumes geographically close jurisdictions to have a greater
e↵ect on each other than more remote jurisdictions and therefore takes into account the distance between
jurisdictions when setting up fiscal reaction functions, e.g. Foucault et al. (2008) in the context of
spending interactions between French municipalities and Redoano (2014) with respect to tax competition
among European countries.
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An ex-ante decision has to be made concerning the weight wj which is attached to each
neighbor municipality j of municipality i. For our baseline specification, all municipalities
within 50 km radius of municipality i are perceived as equally important neighbors and
receive the same weight. We normalize the sum of these contiguity weights to one, thus the
spatial lag is simply the average number of petitions in the neighbor municipalities. For
robustness, we vary the definition of neighbor municipalities by varying the radius to 30 and
70 km. For additional robustness consideration, we use population weights to give credit to
the notion that large neighbor municipalities and their direct democratic activities are more
visible for citizens than the ones of smaller municipalities.10 This might be in particular true
for large municipalities which are likely to compare themselves with other large municipalities
rather than with smaller ones.11
Our underlying data consists of an unbalanced panel of 12,000 to 13,000 German munic-
ipalities across all German states for the years from 2002 to 2009 except of the city states
Hamburg and Berlin.12 Table A1 of the appendix summarizes the data on: state-level insti-
tutions of direct democracy;13 municipality-level data on the frequency of observed petitions
and initiative as our dependent variable; and a number of control variables such as unemploy-
ment rate, population, the share of population above 65 years old and the sum of the vote
shares for the Green Party (Bu¨ndnis90/Die Gru¨nen), the Social Democratic Party (SPD)
and the Left Party (Die Linke) in the federal elections (denoted by “left share” hereafter).
Such reaction functions may be subject to a major endogeneity concern: we explicitly
assume that the likelihood of a petitions in municipality i depends on the number of petitions
10 We normalize the sum of the neighbors’ population to one.
11 Population weights are also used by the more classical spillover literature, for example by Brueckner and
Saavedra (2001) and Baskaran (2014) in a tax competition setting with US and German municipalities
respectively.
12 We exclude these special “city states” since initiatives there are either implemented on the state- (same
as city) or district level, both being something di↵erent than municipalities.
13 One of the main di↵erences in direct democratic institutions are the amount of signatures which have
to be collected within a predefined time period in order to get to the next step of the direct democratic
process. This information is collected from respective state constitutions.
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in municipality j and vice versa - this makes the spatial lag endogenous by definition. The
problem can be circumvented by applying appropriate instruments to the spatial lag. The
literature on budget and tax-setting spillovers cited above uses the (weighted) averaged
demographic and political control variables of the neighbor municipalities to instrument the
spatial lag. However, as argued recently by Baskaran (2014, 2015) this is no golden way
out since this approach is not robust to possible common shocks or spatially correlated
(unobservable) e↵ects.
Following Asatryan (2014), we mitigate this problem by relying on a plausibly exogenous
variable as our main instrument, namely the minimum requirement for the number of signa-
tures which have to be collected within a predefined time as described above. The first-stage
specification therefore regresses the spatial lag on the (weighted) averaged control variables
of the neighbor municipalities (including the signature requirement) and all of the previous
regressors (including the fixed e↵ects) and takes the following form:
NX
j 6=i
wjpjt =  
NX
j 6=i
wjXjt +Xit + ↵2s + µ2t + "2jt (2)
Clearly, our main instrument, the signature requirement, is relevant for the frequency of
petitions in a municipality (non-zero covariance between
PN
j 6=iwjpjt and
PN
j 6=iwjXjt). Fur-
thermore, the exogeneity condition is fulfilled since the signature requirement in municipality
j has no direct e↵ect on the number of petitions in municipality i (signature requirement
is uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage ("it)). This can be safely concluded
since the signature requirements are determined by state-laws and not by the municipalities
themselves. In addition, these state-laws have been implemented well before the period of
analysis mainly in the mid-1990s, but in some cases as early as 1956 (Table A1). Although
set by the states, the instrument do not only vary across states but also by municipalities
within states depending on population thresholds.
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To estimate our (second stage) specification we choose a linear probability model (LPM)
which allows for a binary dependent variable. We think that the advantages of LPM prevail
in our stetting, similar to Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Angrist (2001) who argue in
favor of the LPM instead of alternative models for which the conditions are likely to not be
fulfilled. Certainly, a probit model would ensure that the fitted values fall between zero and
one which is not always the case with LPM; however, curve-fitting grounds and predictions
are not decisive in our context but marginal e↵ects which, in turn, prove to be quite similar
across the models (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, p.80). Furthermore, including fixed e↵ects
makes probit estimates inconsistent (Ferne´ndez-Val, 2009). However, in our model it is
crucial to include state-fixed and time-fixed e↵ects in order to control for unobserved time-
invariant regional factors and the dynamics in direct democratic activity over time.14 In
addition, we necessarily need to employ an instrumental variable approach to deal with the
endogeneity of the spatial lag. Doing this within the framework of non-linear models would
lead to severe additional complexity.15 Throughout our analysis, we use robust standard
errors to account for heteroskedasticity, and cluster the standard errors by municipality.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
Our baseline second stage results are collected in Table 1. The main explanatory variables of
interest are the spatial lag of the sum of citizen-petitions (columns: 1-4) and citizen-initiatives
(columns: 5-8) of neighbor municipalities within a 50 km radius. As specified above, in the
first stage we instrument this spatial lag on the (state-imposed) signature requirements and
14 Bazzi and Blattman (2014) and Friedman and Schady (2013) also use LPM in order to be able to include
fixed e↵ects.
15 Angrist and Pischke (2008, p. 80) also put this point forward when arguing in favor of LPM. Beck
(2011) discusses the trade-o↵ between LPM and non-linear models.
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Table 1: Second stage e↵ects of spillovers from neighbors’ petitions and initiatives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLE Citizen petition dummy
Spatial lag citizen petitions in t 0.1114*** 0.0453***
(0.0977) (0.0973)
Spatial lag citizen petitions in t  1 0.0417**
(0.1066)
Spatial lag citizen petitions in t  2 0.0388**
(0.1089)
Signature requirement -0.3562*** -0.3605*** -0.3601***
(0.2443) (0.2733) (0.2975)
Ln population 0.1031*** 0.1031*** 0.1000***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Unemployment share 0.0085* 0.0083 0.0040
(0.0133) (0.0156) (0.0186)
Share of population over 65 0.0219*** 0.0210*** 0.0206***
(0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0164)
Left share 0.0172*** 0.0144*** 0.0164***
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0060)
Observations 97,581 85,499 71,136 57,656
R-squared 0.0203 0.0436 0.0429 0.0439
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Spatial lag citizen initiatives in t 0.1394*** 0.0592**
(0.3270) (0.3093)
Spatial lag citizen initiatives in t  1 0.0461*
(0.3348)
Spatial lag citizen initiatives in t  2 0.0456*
(0.3497)
Signature requirement -0.3581*** -0.3635*** -0.3622***
(0.2440) (0.2726) (0.2972)
Ln population 0.1029*** 0.1033*** 0.1002***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Unemployment share 0.0077 0.0068 0.0033
(0.0133) (0.0155) (0.0185)
Share of population over 65 0.0217*** 0.0205*** 0.0201***
(0.0140) (0.0150) (0.0163)
Left share 0.0183*** 0.0158*** 0.0174***
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0059)
Observations 97,581 85,499 71,136 57,656
R-squared 0.0163 0.0434 0.0423 0.0423
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents beta coe cients for the second stage estimation of the
linear probability model specified in equation 1. All regressions include time and
state fixed e↵ects as well as border dummies which identify municipalities with
a distance of max. 50 kilometers to the respective border. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the municipality level.
the control variables of neighboring municipalities.1617 The first stage results are reported in
Table A2 of the appendix and show statistically significant coe cients for all instruments.
For the main instrument, as expected, a higher signature requirement is strongly associated
with fewer petitions. Such evidence of a causal negative e↵ect of signature requirements on
direct democratic activity is also demonstrated by Arnold and Freier (2015).
In the main results presented in Table 1, we obtain a significant and positive estimate
for the spatial lag of citizen petitions which is robust to a number of specifications. After
controlling for municipal characteristics, the probability of having a petition increases by
0.045 standard deviations, on average, if the spatial lag is one standard deviation higher.
This means that the probability of hosting a petition rises by about 26% if the neighbors
host one petition more, on average. In columns 3-4 of Table 1 we substitute the spatial lag by
the first and second lagged values of the spatial lag in order to study whether the spillover
e↵ects are persistent over time. Indeed, we observe that the e↵ects hold over time and,
as expected, decrease in size for both of the lagged-e↵ects compared to the simultaneous-
e↵ect. In all three specifications with control variables included, larger population, higher
share of the over 65 years old population and higher left share are all associated with more
frequent petitions, while a higher signature requirement is again correlated with lower direct
democratic activity.
As a next step we include citizen-initiatives in the spatial lag instead of petitions holding
other details of the specification the same. The idea behind this exercise is that initiatives
are likely to have a greater impact on the preferences and behavior of neighbors’ citizens
than petitions since the former are more salient. To remind, initiatives are defined as those
petitions that have already successfully passed the stage of signature collection and have
been voted upon, while petitions may merely be in the initial stages of the process and
16 In order to compare the size of the point estimates across models, we report beta coe cients.
17 To control for the boundary value problem (e.g., Geys and Osterloh, 2013), in all regressions we include
neighbor-country-dummies for municipalities within a 50 km distance to Germany’s nine neighbors.
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thus not known to the greater public. In columns 5-8 of Table 1, in accordance with our
expectations, we observe that the spatial lag in each specification is statistically significant
and is larger than the size of the point estimates of the previous specifications.
4.2 Robustness tests
As robustness test, we check the sensitivity of our results to di↵erent radii in defining neigh-
bors. First, we restrict the choice of neighbor municipalities within a radius of 30 km and,
second, we increase the radius to 70 km from the baseline of 50 km. The results reported in
columns 1-6 of Table 2 largely confirm the main results. These also demonstrate a stronger
spatial e↵ect in close relative to large neighborhoods.
As an additional placebo test, we generate random petitions for all municipalities and
regress them on the true spatial lags of neighbor petitions. The placebo petition dummy has
the same mean as the true petition dummy. The results are also reported in columns 7-9 of
Table 2. As expected, the spatial lags and all other variables are not significant.
Next, we test whether our main results are sensitive to the choice of the weighting scheme
of the spatial lag variable. Table 3 replicates the main results by substituting the main
explanatory variables of interest with the spatial lag of the population-weighted citizen-
petitions (columns: 1-4) and citizen-initiatives (columns: 5-8) of neighbor municipalities
within a 50 km radius. The results are largely robust.
4.3 Extension of results
In this final sub-section we extend our main results by two important empirical tests to
shed more light on the spillover mechanisms. In the first set of regressions we ask whether
the spillovers are due to the mimicking of general direct democratic activity or due to the
di↵usion of specific public policies through petitions on these policies, perhaps accompanied
16
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Table 3: Robustness: Second stage e↵ects of spillovers from neighbors’ weighted petitions
and initiatives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLE Citizen petition dummy
Spatial lag citizen petitions in t 0.0545*** 0.0253**
(0.0115) (0.0121)
Spatial lag citizen petitions in t  1 0.0283**
(0.0129)
Spatial lag citizen petitions in t  2 0.0312**
(0.0140)
Signature requirement -0.3663*** -0.3645*** -0.3645***
(0.2468) (0.2709) (0.2951)
Ln population 0.1032*** 0.1036*** 0.1001***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Unemployment share 0.0097* 0.0103* 0.0045
(0.0141) (0.0162) (0.0191)
Share of population over 65 0.0219*** 0.0212*** 0.0214***
(0.0142) (0.0153) (0.0167)
Left share 0.0240*** 0.0212*** 0.0237***
(0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0062)
Observations 99,458 85,515 71,136 57,656
R-squared 0.0154 0.0422 0.0425 0.0436
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Spatial lag citizen initiatives in t 0.1141*** 0.0693**
(0.1004) (0.0938)
Spatial lag citizen initiatives in t  1 0.0683**
(0.0875)
Spatial lag citizen initiatives in t  2 0.0687**
(0.0915)
Signature requirement -0.3650*** -0.3631*** -0.3623***
(0.2476) (0.2719) (0.2964)
Ln population 0.1032*** 0.1041*** 0.1015***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Unemployment share 0.0085 0.0096 0.0046
(0.0137) (0.0161) (0.0193)
Share of population over 65 0.0217*** 0.0206*** 0.0202***
(0.0142) (0.0152) (0.0166)
Left share 0.0239*** 0.0209*** 0.0234***
(0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0062)
Observations 99,458 85,515 71,136 57,656
R-squared 0.0071 0.0390 0.0388 0.0391
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents beta coe cients for the second stage estimation of the
linear probability model specified in equation 1. All regressions include time and
state fixed e↵ects as well as border dummies which identify municipalities with
a distance of max. 50 kilometers to the respective border. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the municipality level.
by shifts in local voters’ preferences. Secondly, we are interested to see whether informational
channels – such as newspaper circulation – play a role in these patterns of interactions as it
is the case for the di↵usion of movements.
Up to now, we have demonstrated that all petitions and initiatives in the neighborhood
positively a↵ect the likelihood of hosting any petition. This result allows arguing that the
use of direct democratic instruments might have spillovers itself as voters learn about a new
political tool they can exercise in general.18
Table 4: Second stage e↵ects of spillovers from neighbors’ petitions by topic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Citizen petition dummy culture tra c land use plan economy infrastructure
Spatial lag culture 0.0369 -0.0240 0.0289 -0.0565** 0.0180
(0.3407) (0.5208) (0.1860) (0.6103) (0.9537)
Spatial lag tra c 0.0187 0.0422* 0.0520*** -0.0116 0.0717***
(0.1340) (0.2183) (0.0958) (0.2696) (0.3686)
Spatial lag land use plan -0.0043 0.0491** 0.0963*** -0.0187 0.0472**
(0.2597) (0.4508) (0.2712) (0.6459) (0.8366)
Spatial lag economy 0.0274 0.0131 0.0270 0.0521* 0.0610**
(0.1156) (0.2003) (0.1010) (0.2475) (0.3275)
Spatial lag infrastructure 0.0174 0.0143 0.0256* -0.0056 0.0467***
(0.0493) (0.0744) (0.0291) (0.0899) (0.1277)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents second stage estimates as beta coe cients of the linear probability model
specified in equation 1. Spatial lags are not lagged and contain municipalities within a radius of 50
kilometers. All regressions include time, state fixed e↵ects, the control variables as defined before
and border dummies. The border dummies identify municipalities with a distance of max. 50
kilometers to the respective border. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the municipality level.
18 Parallels can be drawn to the literature that studies the cross-border di↵usion of democracy (Elkink,
2011), regime change (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006), and riots (Aidt and Franck, 2015).
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In Table 4 we advance a step further by dividing the petitions into five main public policy
areas over which petitions can be held – culture, tra c, land use, economy and infrastructure
– and then estimating the baseline simultaneous regressions with controls both within and
across these topics. All five within-topic coe cients except for culture reported on the
diagonal of Table 4 show significant e↵ects. These results broadly support the hypothesis
that the interaction e↵ects are largely driven by spillovers in specific public policies. Petitions
on land use, tra c and infrastructure – topics that are related to each other – are also
spatially correlated in the bilateral regressions.
Next, we test whether the cross-municipal spillovers in petitions are conditional on the
availability and exchange of information. One of the important spillover mechanisms we
have in mind is one that functions through popular media. Vetoing or inaugurating a certain
policy in one municipality may have the most impact on neighboring town’s voters when they
are su ciently informed. To test this hypothesis we divide the municipalities according to
whether on a per household basis these purchase daily local newspapers above or below the
median town.19 Results for both the baseline and population-weighted spatial lag indicators
for the two sub-samples are collected in Table 5. Conditional on the town-size and a number
of further controls, we find robust evidence of significant spatial interactions in towns with
above-median number of newspapers but not for those with below-median newspapers.20
This exercise reveals that information is one important transmission channel through which
spillovers in petitions spread.
19 We rely on the definition of local newspapers and data on 2008’s local newspaper circulation by Falck
et al. (2014). The data provides the annual number of daily local newspapers per household for each
municipality in 2008.
20 The number of newspapers does not seem to be correlated with other variables that a↵ect the probability
of hosting a petition. Means and standard deviations of the control variables are similar for the two
sub-samples.
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5 Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge, previous literature has not yet tested or conceptualized the
proposed hypothesis that voters and interest groups of related jurisdictions may mimic each
others behavior through the means of direct democracy. The channels of such interactions
may be quite di↵erent and complex, going from spillovers in policy-preferences to the process
of learning to exploit direct democratic rights. Further research on the behavior of individuals
and, especially, organized groups of individuals in the social interaction analysis (e.g., Manski,
2000) may help to shed more light into these and perhaps more interaction mechanisms.
However, what this analysis adds to the literature is that mimicking between jurisdictions
takes place not only through government-level interactions (learning, di↵usion, fiscal and
yardstick competition) but also through voters’ direct actions in vetoing and inaugurating
policies through binding-initiatives. Such interactions are, of course, conditional on the
existence of some institutions of direct democracy, which are currently not any more rare
especially in sub-national levels of high-income countries.
If this reasoning is true, then it is important to recognize and quantify such interactions,
because direct democracy matters for policy-outcomes. Studies traditionally concentrating
on US and Switzerland, but more recently also extending to Germany and other countries,
find empirical support that direct democratic instruments a↵ect policies in the public sector
in general, and fiscal decisions in particular. Although, we find evidence for spatial spillovers
in initiatives, it is left to future work to assess to what extent do such mimicking behavior
drive policy outcomes.
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Figure A1: Geographical distribution of petitions in German towns from 2002 to 2009
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Table A2: First-stage results of Table 1 - determinants of citizen-petitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLE Spatial lag citizen petitions
t t  1 t  2
PN
j 6=i(wj⇥signature requirement j) -0.2738*** -0.2487*** -0.2157*** -0.2104***
(0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0165) (0.0193)PN
j 6=i(wj⇥ln population j) 0.4308*** 0.4401*** 0.4409*** 0.4916***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)PN
j 6=i(wj⇥unemployment share j) 0.0732*** 0.0813*** 0.0236** 0.0113
(0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0062)PN
j 6=i(wj⇥population share over 65 j) -0.0499*** -0.0468*** -0.0444*** 0.0101
(0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0148) (0.0168)PN
j 6=i(wj⇥left share j) 0.0017 -0.0039 0.0137 0.0010
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Signature requirement -0.1284*** -0.1329*** -0.1615***
(0.0205) (0.0217) (0.0254)
Ln population -0.0114*** -0.0137*** -0.0141***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment share 0.0015 0.0197*** 0.0082
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0026)
Share of population over 65 0.0010 0.0006 0.0054*
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Left share 0.0434*** 0.0418*** 0.0546***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Observations 97,581 85,499 71,136 57,656
R-squared 0.6118 0.6144 0.6009 0.6219
F-test first stage 1145 1042 964.5 844.8
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents beta coe cients for the OLS first stage estimation of the
model specified in equation 2. All regressions include time and state fixed e↵ects
as well as border dummies which identify municipalities with a distance of max. 50
kilometers to the respective border. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and are clustered at the municipality level.
